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ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTION, ARRESTS, AND CON-
FESSION TO ,IMPEACH CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS.
The recent case of Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 132 O.S.
78, 5 N.E. (2d) 153 (1936) presents the problem of the admissibility of
questions upon cross-examination asked for the purposes of impeaching
the credibility of a witness. The plaintiff brought the action upon a
fire insurance policy issued by defendant. The plaintiff upon the cross-
examination was asked, "Isn't it a fact that when Sperling refused to
pay you any money you went to the police department and made a con-
fession of your part in the plot to destroy the Middle West Hat Co.?"
The trial court sustained an objection to the question. The Supreme
Court reversed the ruling and held the question was proper.
At common law questions whether the witness had committed any
crime have frequently been asked upon cross-examination. Of course,
the witness may have a privilege against answering such questions.
But in many states the trial court in its discretion may permit such
questions to be asked. People v. Turney, 124 Mich. 542, 83 N.W. 273
(I9OO); Tla-Koa-Yelee v. United States, 167 U.S. 274 17 Sup. Ct.
855 (1896); State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 16l, 37 Pac. 1005 (1894); 5
Jones on Evidence Sec. 832.
In Ohio it has been held permissible to ask a witness whether he has
been arrested. Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178, 41 Am. Rep. 496
(1882); Colbe v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100, 20 O.L.R. 487 (1876);
Wroe v. State, 20 0. S. 460, 5 Dec. Rep. 55 (1870)- In the Wroe
Case the court said, "The limits to which a witness may be cross-
examined on matters not relevant to the issue, for the purpose of
judging of his character and credit from his own voluntary admissions,
rests in the sound discretion of the court trying the cause. Such questions
may be allowed when there is reason to believe it will tend to the ends
of justice; but they ought to be excluded when a disparaging course of
examinations seems unjust to the witness, and uncalled for by the cir-
cumstances of the case." Brandon v. People, 42 N.Y. 265, 40 Cyc.
2621 (1870); People v. Fong Ching, 78 Cal. 169, 20 Pac. 396
(1889); Parkerv. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S.W. 603 (1894); Statev.
Duncan, 7 Wash. 336, 38 Am. St. Rep. 103 (1893).
Hamilton v. State 34 Ohio St. 82 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 103 (880)
was the first case in Ohio in which the court held that it was per-
missible to ask a witness on cross-examination if he had been indicted
for a crime. This case was soon followed by Hanoff v. State, supra,
which said it was not reversible error to ask a witness whether he had
been arrested and indicted. This seemed to be the prevailing view in
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Ohio until the case of Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio St. 136, 152 N.E. 28
(1926) was decided. The Supreme Court held in that case that the
only proper course to follow when cross-examining a witness with
reference to collateral offenses, for the purpose of affecting his credi-
bility is to ask him whether he has been convicted of the offense in
question. The court said that if the party had been convicted, there was
no need to show the indictment, and if he had not been convicted,
there was no more reason for presuming him guilty of that crime be-
cause of the indictment than for presuming him guilty of the one for
which he is now being tried. And for the present trial the presumption
of course, is that he is innocent. In the syllabus of the principal case the
Wagner case is "approved, followed, and distinguished." But the rule
of the Wagner case that you canot inquire about previous indictments is
not altered in the instant case.
In the principal case the court held that a witness could be asked if
he had voluntarily confessed that he had committed a crime. Of course,
this could not be reconciled with a doctrine that the only way to prove
a crime is by showing proof of conviction. But such a rule seems to
unduly limit the cross-examination. In many states a witness may be
asked if he committed a certain crime.
The holding in the principal case, however, may be reconciled with
the ruling that an indictment cannot be shown. In proving the indict-
ment, the party is offering the opinion of the grand jury that there was
probable cause to believe the witness guilty of the crime. It is hearsay
since the grand jury is not present in court to be examined. While the
confession also is hearsay since it was made out of the court there is not
the same objection to admissibility since the party making the con-
fession is present in court and upon the stand. The confession, if
voluntary, is convincing and for probative effect falls little if any short
of proof of a conviction. It is submitted that the Supreme Court rightly
held that the question was proper. R. W. VANDEMARK.
EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF DEFENDANT OF DEFECT NECES-
SARY TO TAKE CASE TO JURY ON ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiff proved that she was a customer in the defendant's
store; that a foot-stool or sewing-stool obstructed the aisle; that the de-
fect in the aisle caused her to fall; and that the stool belonged to the
counter of which a saleslady had charge, supervision, and control, and
was returned to the counter after the plaintiff fell over it. The court
held that the plaintiff had not presented a prima facie case to go to the
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